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Abstract 
 
The endorsement of anti-corruption norms is a normative assumption in legal systems with 
freedom of information acts, where citizens are expected to act as monitors of the public service. 
Tolerance of corruption counteracts this assumption. We studied tolerance of corruption among 
8th graders from Latin-American samples of the International Civic and Citizenship Study 2009. 
We proposed a model where associations between students’ socioeconomic status (SES) and 
tolerance of corruption are explained by civic knowledge, authoritarianism and open classroom 
discussion. This model accounted for 36% to 43% of the variance within schools, and 87% to 
96% of the variance between schools, across six countries. The socioeconomic gap in tolerance 
of corruption was mainly present between schools. In addition, students with higher civic 
knowledge were less tolerant of corruption, partially explained by authoritarianism, while open 
classroom discussion also had indirect associations with tolerance of corruption. 
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Introduction 
 
Corruption is a threat to democracy. Countries that suffer from corruption also suffer 
from weaker institutions and political instability (Dimant & Tosato, 2018), less trust in 
government institutions (Seligson, 2006), and less support for democracy (Moreno, 2002), all of 
which serve to hinder governments' legitimacy. At present, Latin American countries are known 
to have some of the highest levels of corruption, higher than expected given their economic 
development (Morris, 2006). 
Numerous countries have introduced legislation to promote freedom of information to 
combat corruption (Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006), which enables their citizens to 
enforce more governmental transparency. However, the translation of such legislation into 
reduced corruption practices is heavily dependent on the role of the citizens themselves 
(Escaleras, Lin, & Register, 2010). The willingness of people to tolerate acts of corruption as 
commonplace and not worthy of punishment hinders the efforts to reduce corruption (Pop, 
2012). From a social norms point of view, tolerance of corruption weakens democracy by 
normalising rule-breaking behaviour (Lavena, 2013). 
Schools constitute one essential context for the promotion of anti-corruption efforts. At 
present, civic education is a feature of the educational curriculum for every Latin American 
country included in the present study: Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and the 
Dominican Republic (Bascopé, Bonhomme, Cox, Castillo, & Miranda, 2015). The present work 
investigates how civic knowledge, authoritarianism, and open classroom discussion explain 
tolerance of corruption among secondary students in the Latin American countries participating 
in the International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS) 2009. For these purposes, we fit a 
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multilevel path analysis to assess the expected relations and make inferences between schools. In 




The “sophistication hypothesis” proposes that populations with higher levels of education 
develop more sophisticated political attitudes (Highton, 2009; Houtman, 2003; Luskin, 1990). 
More educated adults are expected to possess extensive and organised knowledge that structures 
political opinions, facts and concepts (Lyons, 2017). Studies using the World Values Survey 
have consistently found a small negative association between educational attainment and 
tolerance of corruption (Lavena, 2013; Zakaria, 2018). 
The intergenerational transmission hypothesis (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2013) 
asserts that political inequities between adults are transmitted from parents to their offspring. 
This occurs because more educated families provide a richer political environment for the 
development of different political outcomes, while also promoting the development of cognitive 
abilities required to influence those political outcomes (Miranda, 2018). Thus, we expect 
adolescent students from lower SES families to present more tolerance of corruption, replicating 
the gap observed among adults (Lavena, 2013; Zakaria, 2018). Moreover, following the 
sophistication hypothesis, we expected that these relations are largely mediated and explained by 
the students’ current levels of political sophistication.  
To assess the sophistication hypothesis, we include a direct measure of political 
sophistication included in the ICCS 2009 study: civic knowledge scores (Schulz, Fraillon, & 
Ainley, 2013, p. 336). The civic knowledge score ranks students in terms of knowledge, 
understanding and reasoning of political issues (Schulz, Ainley, & Fraillon, 2011). Students at 
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the lowest end of the scale understand the role of freedom of press to guarantee the accuracy of 
information delivered by news media. In contrast, students with the highest scores can explain 
more complex matters, such as evaluating a public policy concerning equality (Schulz et al., 
2013). We expect students with a higher comprehension of political institutions and the code of 
law (Lavena, 2013), and a more complex capacity to reflect on political matters, to be less 
tolerant of corruption than their counterparts. 
 
Ideology as an Explanatory Factor  
Political ideology is a conceptual device that helps to explain why people do what they 
do, and what moral and political attitudes people hold (Jost, 2006). It consists of how attitudes, 
values and beliefs about the social order are organized (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Thus, 
knowing which political ideology people have, one can have expectations about their attitudes, 
values, and beliefs. Differing strategies have been used to study political ideology. Theory-
driven approaches use self-identification of political orientation (e.g., Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 
2008), or specific ideological domains, including authoritarianism, social dominance, and system 
justification beliefs, among other measures (Jost et al., 2009). Among the different domains of 
ideological beliefs, authoritarianism has been widely studied as a consistent predictor of political 
orientation, prejudice, homophobia and sexism (Christopher & Wojda, 2008; Duckitt, Wagner, 
du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Napier & Jost, 2008; Whitley & Lee, 2000). 
Authoritarianism is a fundamental worldview (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), consisting of an 
orientation of people to support strong authorities and punish social deviants (Altemeyer, 1981). 
Individual differences regarding corruption have shown that more authoritarian individuals 
express more corruption intentions than their less authoritarian peers (Tan, Liu, Zheng, & Huang, 
2015), are more permissive towards authorities involved in unethical practices (Salamzadeh, 
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2012), and are more tolerant of corruption (Wang & Bernardo, 2017). This is due to a tendency 
to comply with the unethical behaviour from people who hold authority, and to be less prone to 
question such authorities (Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, & McBride, 2007). As such, we expect 
that students with higher levels of authoritarianism present higher levels of tolerance of 
corruption. The present study contributes to this line of research, by testing this relation among 
representative samples of 8th graders from six Latino-American countries. 
The endorsement of authoritarianism is classically understood as an anti-democratic 
syndrome more prevalent in individuals of low educational attainment (Lipset, 1959). 
Economically disadvantaged groups present higher levels of authoritarianism, especially for the 
facets of obedience to authority (Napier & Jost, 2008). Following the intergenerational 
transmission hypothesis, we expect students from lower socio-economic status families to 
endorse higher authoritarianism. Complementary to this, previous studies have consistently 
found a negative relation between civic knowledge and authoritarianism (Schulz, Ainley, Cox, & 
Friedman, 2018; Schulz, Ainley, Friedman, & Lietz, 2011). This means that enhanced civic 
knowledge may serve as a safeguard against authoritarianism endorsement. Following these 
latter studies, we specify students’ political sophistication as a negative predictor of students’ 
authoritarianism. Consequently, we include authoritarianism as a mediator of the relationship 
between SES, civic knowledge, and tolerance of corruption. 
 
School Practices: The Role of Discussions 
Within the literature of political socialisation and civic education, classroom discussion is 
considered a relevant factor in how the school promotes citizenship skills (Almond & Verba, 
1989; Grossman, 2011; Hahn & Tocci, 1990). Past research has shown that open classroom 
discussion has positive relations with civic knowledge (Isac, Maslowski, Creemers, & van der 
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Werf, 2014; Persson, 2015), and negative relations with authoritarianism (Hahn & Tocci, 1990), 
among several other civic outcomes (Knowles & McCafferty-Wright, 2015). All in all, open 
classroom discussion possesses a large body of literature in favour of its positive returns. 
Open classroom discussion is a classroom environment feature which differentiates the 
extent to which students are encouraged to express their opinions and discuss different points of 
view, guided by their teacher (Ehman, 1969; Hahn, 2011). It refers to the extent to which 
students are able to discuss issues with their peers and with their teachers (Ehman, 1969), and 
distinguishes whether or not students within the classroom can debate different sides of an 
argument when discussing social and political issues (Carrasco & Torres Irribarra, 2018). This 
classroom feature enhances political knowledge because it encourages students to articulate 
questions and answers, in a meaningful context, facilitating the understanding of controversies 
(Harris, 1996). 
 
Classroom Discussion and Student’s SES 
It is assumed that open classroom discussion has a compensatory role in the political 
socialization of students. Schools provide learning opportunities that are fewer or absent at home 
for low SES students (Hoskins, Janmaat, & Melis, 2017), because open discussion is less 
frequent among less affluent families (Bernstein, 2003). Thus, it is expected to mitigate the effect 
of the lack of political socialisation of disadvantaged students (Hoskins et al., 2017). 
However, the access to open classrooms discussion might not be equal for all students. In 
school effectiveness research, this is referred to as the question of a learning opportunity gap, 
where the access to certain school practices is not equally distributed within the population of 
students (Akiba, LeTendre, & Scribner, 2007). This line of research in civic education is limited, 
and we have found two examples of these studies, from the US and from the UK. Kahne & 
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Middaugh (2008), found that more disadvantaged students in the US have less access to service 
learning and to the exercise of debates, than the students from more affluent families. Hoskin, 
Janmaat & Melis (2017) found a small positive relation between students’ SES and open 
classroom discussion among British students. In the current study, we assess the learning 
opportunity gap, by studying the relationship between students’ SES and schools’ open 
classroom discussion, for 8th graders among six Latin-American countries. 
 
Classroom Discussion and Authoritarianism 
A higher exposure to open classroom discussion is expected to be negatively related to 
authoritarianism (Hahn, 2011). Simultaneously, as noted above, authoritarianism is expected to 
be positively related to tolerance of corruption (Salamzadeh, 2012; Wang & Bernardo, 2017). 
Furthermore, schools with more frequent open classroom discussion are expected to improve 
civic knowledge, while simultaneously reducing or preventing authoritarianism endorsement 
(Schulz et al., 2018; Schulz, Ainley, Friedman, et al., 2011). Thus, higher exposure to open 
classroom discussion might present indirect relations to tolerance of corruption via 
authoritarianism and civic knowledge. 
Intergenerational research indicates that authoritarianism is transmitted from parents to 
offspring, directly and indirectly through need for closure (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2013). 
Need for closure is an individual difference where people tend to think of reality in simple 
structures, reflected in a desire to have a single clear answer to a given issue (De keersmaecker et 
al., 2017), even if it is an oversimplification. As such, school programs aimed at reducing need 
for closure may have returns in other political attitudes explained by authoritarianism (Van Hiel, 
Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Open classroom discussion seems a good candidate for this end: it 
fosters students’ tolerance of dissent (Ehman, 1980), it helps to evaluate others views critically, 
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and it promotes the exercise of agreeing to disagree (Claes, Maurissen, & Havermans, 2017), all 
aspects that countervail need for closure. 
 
The Present Study 
In the present study we fit a series of multilevel path analyses to assess what factors 
account for students’ tolerance of corruption in different Latin-American countries. With these 
modelling techniques we assess the direct and indirect effects of SES, via open classroom 
discussion, civic knowledge, and authoritarianism, while providing cluster specific inferences 
between learning environments. 
First, we argue that it is not the SES of students per se that makes them at risk of being 
more tolerant of corruption, but the lack of civic knowledge (Schulz & Macaskill, 2015). Hence, 
we make the hypothesis that civic knowledge is a mediator for the effects of SES on tolerance of 
corruption and on authoritarianism (Napier & Jost, 2008). Furthermore, because of the negative 
relation between authoritarianism and civic knowledge (Schulz et al., 2018; Schulz, Ainley, 
Friedman, et al., 2011), and its expected positive relation to tolerance of corruption (Wang & 
Bernardo, 2017) we include authoritarianism as a second potential mediator in the relationship 
between SES and tolerance of corruption. Additionally, we estimate the predictive effect of SES 
on open classroom discussion, following the learning opportunity gap hypothesis (Hoskins et al., 
2017; Kahne & Middaugh, 2008). Likewise, we include direct effects from open classroom 
discussion to civic knowledge (Isac et al., 2014; Persson, 2015), and to authoritarianism (Hahn & 
Tocci, 1990) following previous literature. Finally, we also include direct effects of open 
classroom discussion on tolerance of corruption to assess its relative influence. Figure 1 depicts 
our main conceptual model, which includes all expected relations between variables. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model to explain tolerance of corruption among students 
 
 
With these models, we aim to answer the following questions: what are the main 
predictors of tolerance of corruption among 8th graders in the Latino American samples of ICCS 
2009? What is the relationship between SES and tolerance of corruption? What are the main 
drivers of the socioeconomic gap in tolerance of corruption? How much of these differences are 
attributable to the learning opportunity gap concerning open classroom discussion? What is the 
relationship between open classroom discussion and tolerance of corruption, and is this 
association indirect via civic knowledge and authoritarianism? What is the relationship between 
civic knowledge and tolerance of corruption, and is this association indirect via authoritarianism? 
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Method 
Data  
The present study uses ICCS 2009 data. It includes representative samples of 8th grade 
students (13.5 years of age) from Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Paraguay. It samples intact school classrooms from around 150 schools, collecting data from 
over 3000 students for each country (for more details see Schulz, Ainley, Friedman, et al., 2011).  
 
Measures 
From ICCS 2009 we retrieved several multi-item scale scores generated using item 
response theory (IRT) methods. Table 1 summarizes the selected variables, including their means 
and standard deviations at the population level. The main dependent variable in the present study 
is tolerance of corruption. This is a scale of 5 items, where students indicated their level of 
agreement with items such as ‘It is acceptable for a civil servant to use the resources of the 
institution in which he/she works for personal benefit’. As predictors of tolerance of corruption, 
we include authoritarianism, civic knowledge, open classroom discussion, and SES. 
Authoritarianism summarizes the endorsement of authoritarian practices from the government, 
using the responses to 9 items. This scale includes items such as ‘People in government must 
enforce their authority even if it means violating the rights of some citizens’, and ‘Concentration 
of power in one person guarantees order’. A detailed report on the construction of each 




Running head: TOLERANCE TO CORRUPTION AMONG SECONDARY STUDENTS 12 
Table 1 
Population Means (Standard Deviations), and Sampled Observations for Each Country 
 
Note. Population means, and standard deviations point estimates, accounting for sampling 
design. Nominal samples for each country are included. 
 
Civic knowledge is represented by five plausible values, with an international mean of 
500 and a standard deviation of 100 (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke, 2011). It is a 
measure of political sophistication (Schulz et al., 2013) that includes knowledge and 
understanding of civics and citizenship. The SES of students is a derived index using the highest 
occupational status and the highest educational level of students’ parents, and the number of 
books at home. The measure of open classroom discussion is a multi-item scale (6 items) 
assessing students’ reports on how often ‘teachers encourage students to express their opinions’, 
when discussing political and social issues during regular lessons. All these Likert-type scales 
  Chile Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 




48.64 48.18 54.84 49.94 49.17 49.53 
(10.44) (9.22) (9.08) (9.48) (10.57) (9.62) 
Socioeconomic 
Status (SES) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




483.02 461.93 380.25 434.57 451.65 423.7 
(87.52) (80.85) (66.38) (75.7) (82.81) (88.88) 
Authoritarianism 
(AUT) 
48.00 48.49 54.18 50.17 48.97 50.3 




52.32 50.14 47.34 52.61 50.12 49.45 
(10.09) (8.83) (9.97) (9.57) (9.36) (8.61) 
Number of 
schools 177 196 145 145 215 149 
Number of 
Students 5192 6204 4589 4002 6576 3399 
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are multi-item IRT weighted likelihood estimate scores with an international mean of 50 and 
standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted countries. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
We specify a series of multilevel path analyses to assess the overall relations among SES, 
open classroom discussion, civic knowledge, authoritarianism, and tolerance of corruption. 
Driven by the reviewed literature, we include all interrelations among our main variables. We 
produce estimates for each country, and also fit a multigroup model, where parameters were 
constrained to be equal between countries to resemble meta-analytic estimates (Möller, 
Pohlmann, Köller, & Marsh, 2009). These latter estimates are the most likely estimates for the 
studied relations across countries, while accounting for their standard errors simultaneously. 
To describe the main results, we refer to the constrained model estimates presented in 
Tables 3A and 3B in the left-hand side column. We also present the results from each country in 
contiguous columns. We describe the main results using the constrained model and highlight the 
country specific results when noticeable heterogeneity is observed, that is, when country specific 
estimates of the confidence interval do not overlap with the confidence interval of estimates in 
the constrained model. 
We first estimated the saturated model with all the expected relations. We used the results 
of this model to identify the main predictors of tolerance of corruption among students, and to 
assess the indirect effects of SES, particularly estimating how much of the SES effect is 
accounted for by the learning opportunity gap in open classroom discussion. To assess the 
proportion of the indirect effect attributable to the mediators, we compute the R2 mediated effect, 
and the proportion of the absolute overall effect that is mediated. The R2 mediated effect is an 
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overall measure of how much of the explained variance is attributable to the included mediators 
(Fairchild, MacKinnon, Taborga, & Taylor, 2009). To assess the proportion of the indirect effect 
attributable to the learning opportunity gap, we compute proportion of the absolute overall effect 
that is mediated (Fairchild & McQuillin, 2010) by open classroom discussion. 
We specified an alternative model with fewer parameters, where we constrained the 
parameters of SES on authoritarianism and on tolerance of corruption to zero. This latter model 
expresses a full mediation model where SES is connected to tolerance of corruption only via its 
mediators. We assessed if this constrained model presents an acceptable fit to the data (Heck & 
Thomas, 2015; Masyn, 2013). We used this model comparison to assess the intergenerational-
sophistication hypothesis, where SES effects are expected to predict tolerance of corruption and 
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Figure 2: Saturated Model: expected associations with tolerance of corruption 
 
 
Note. SES = socioeconomic status of students, CIV = civic knowledge, AUT = authoritarianism, 
OPD = classroom discussion, COR = tolerance of corruption. _w = stands for within school 
centred variables, and _β = stands for between school components centred at the grand mean. 
 
 
All statistical analyses were conducted with MPLUS 8.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) to 
account for complex sample design (Rutkowski, Gonzalez, Joncas, & von Davier, 2010), which 
uses pseudo maximum likelihood for variance estimation (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010; 
Stapleton, 2013). To avoid ill-scaled variance matrices due to the scale differences, we divided 
civic knowledge scores by 10 (see Kline, 2016, p. 81). To fit these models, all endogenous 
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variables (SES, civic knowledge and authoritarianism) were separated into two orthogonal 
components: the within school variation (centred within cluster), and the between school 
variation (centred to the grand mean of each country). Because open classroom discussion is a 
reflective measure of a school attribute (Stapleton, Yang, & Hancock, 2016), the between-
schools component is the measure of interest. When students act as informants about the school 
discussion practices (Lüdtke et al., 2008), the school component expresses learning environment 
differences, while the within school component expresses deviations of individual students’ 
perceptions from those of their peers in the same school. 
Overall, this centring approach enables us to pool all the results into a synthetic model, 
where between-country differences were removed. Using a regression analysis with fixed effects 
for countries, we found that countries only account for 5% of the variance in tolerance of 
corruption at population level. Thus, our modelling choices offer a reasonable alternative to 





The intra class correlation of tolerance of corruption was .10, CI95% [.09; .12] in the 
constrained model, varying from .08 to .14 between countries. The fitted model accounts for 
41% of the within variance, and it varies from 36% to 43%. At the between level, this model 
accounts for 92%, varying from 87% to 96%. In Table 2, we report these fit indexes of the 
saturated model, and the intra class correlation of tolerance of corruption for each participating 
country. 
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Table 2 









Multigroup .10 .41 .92 
Chile .10 .41 .91 
Colombia .08 .36 .94 
Dominican Republic .12 .43 .87 
Guatemala .12 .42 .93 
Mexico .09 .43 .96 
Paraguay .14 .42 .93 
Note. ICC = intra class correlation for the null model of tolerance of corruption. 
 
Main predictors of Tolerance of corruption 
At the student level, the predictor with the greatest effect size on tolerance of corruption 
is authoritarianism. In the multigroup model, its standardized effect is of .52 (SE =.01, CI95% 
[.50, .54], p<.001), and in each of the countries, we found similar estimates (see Table 3A). 
Thus, students with higher levels of authoritarianism were more tolerant of corruption. The 
predictor of tolerance of corruption, with the next largest coefficient is civic knowledge. It 
reaches a standardized effect of -.19 (SE =.01, CI95% [-.21, -.17], p<.001) in the constrained 
model, and this effect is larger for Guatemala, where its standardized effect is -.26 (SE =.02, 
CI95% [-.31, -.22], p<.001). As such, students with higher civic knowledge are less inclined to 
accept corruption. Note that student SES presents no significant direct effects on tolerance of 
corruption in the constrained model (𝛽 = .01, SE =.01, CI95% [-.01, .02], p=.25). Country 
specific results of this covariate overlap with the constrained model confidence interval. 
In Table 3B, we present the school level estimates. The predictor with the highest size is 
again authoritarianism, with a standardized effect in the constrained model of .84 (SE =.03, 
CI95% [.78, .89], p<.001). For Guatemala, this effect is smaller than the rest of the countries, 
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reaching a standardized effect of .59 (SE =.07, CI95% [.46, .72], p<.001). Thus, schools with 
higher levels of authoritarianism present higher levels of tolerance of corruption in comparison 
to other schools. In addition, schools with higher civic knowledge present lower levels of 
tolerance of corruption, reaching a standardized effect of -.19 (SE =.04, CI95% [-.26, -.11], 
p<.001) in the constrained model. Inspecting the country specific results, we found that 
Guatemala presents a larger coefficient than the rest of the compared countries, where its 
standardized effect is of -.41 (SE =.09, CI95% [-.59, -.23], p<.001), whereas Paraguay and the 
Dominican Republic present non-significant effects on this estimate. However, all country 
estimates overlap with the confidence interval of the constrained model. Finally, the school-level 
SES does not have a significant direct association with tolerance of corruption (𝛽 = .02, SE =.03, 
CI95% [-.04, .08], p=.52), with the exception of Colombia, where a positive relation is observed, 
albeit with a wide confidence interval (𝛽 = .17, SE =.08, CI95% [.01, .32], p<.05). No 
significant direct effect of open classroom discussion was observed among all countries. 
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Table 3A 
Multilevel path analysis student level estimates 
 
 
  Multigroup Chile Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 










SES→COR 0.09  0.06  0.26  0.06  0.37 * -0.08  -0.15  
  ( .01)  ( .00)  ( .02)  ( .01)  ( .03)  (-.01)  (-.01)  
CIV→COR -0.26 *** -0.29 *** -0.23 *** -0.26 *** -0.40 *** -0.25 *** -0.18 *** 
  (-.19)  (-.21)  (-.18)  (-.18)  (-.26)  (-.18)  (-.14)  
AUT→COR 0.53 *** 0.52 *** 0.51 *** 0.51 *** 0.51 *** 0.53 *** 0.62 *** 
  ( .52)  ( .50)  ( .49)  ( .55)  ( .46)  ( .54)  ( .56)  
OPD→COR -0.02 ** -0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.05 ** -0.02  -0.02  
  (-.02)  (-.02)  (-.01)  ( .00)  (-.06)  (-.02)  (-.01)  
SES→AUT 0.13  -0.26  0.18  0.19  0.16  0.13  0.34  
  ( .01)  (-.02)  ( .02)  ( .02)  ( .02)  ( .01)  ( .03)  
CIV→AUT -0.68 *** -0.71 *** -0.62 *** -0.69 *** -0.63 *** -0.78 *** -0.53 *** 
  (-.50)  (-.52)  (-.49)  (-.44)  (-.46)  (-.55)  (-.46)  
OPD→AUT -0.02 ** 0.01  -0.02  -0.07 *** -0.08 *** 0.00  -0.05 * 
  (-.02)  ( .01)  (-.02)  (-.07)  (-.09)  ( .00)  (-.05)  
SES→CIV 0.80 *** 1.25 *** 0.85 *** 0.25  0.83 *** 0.76 *** 1.03 *** 
  ( .10)  ( .13)  ( .10)  ( .04)  ( .11)  ( .08)  ( .11)  
OPD→CIV 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.20 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.16 *** 
  ( .20)  ( .17)  ( .25)  ( .26)  ( .19)  ( .16)  ( .19)  
SES→OPD 0.26 ** 0.03  0.50 ** 0.27  0.15  0.29  0.15  










 CIV → AUT → COR -0.36 *** -0.37 *** -0.32 *** -0.35 *** -0.32 *** -0.41 *** -0.33 *** 
  (-.26)  (-.26)  (-.24)  (-.24)  (-.21)  (-.30)  (-.26)  
 
Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Unstandardized estimates (Standardized estimates). SES = socioeconomic status of students, CIV = civic 
knowledge, AUT = authoritarianism, OPD = classroom discussion, COR = tolerance of corruption. 
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Table 3B 
Multilevel path analysis school level estimates 
 
  Multigroup Chile Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 














SES→COR 0.11  0.57  0.70 * -0.07  -0.46  0.04  -0.54  
  ( .02)  ( .11)  ( .17)  (-.01)  (-.08)  ( .01)  (-.08)  
CIV→COR -0.14 *** -0.16 * -0.14 * -0.10  -0.30 *** -0.08 * 0.04  
  (-.19)  (-.22)  (-.22)  (-.10)  (-.41)  (-.11)  ( .06)  
AUT→COR 0.70 *** 0.76 *** 0.74 *** 0.62 *** 0.51 *** 0.74 *** 0.91 *** 
  ( .84)  ( .85)  ( .87)  ( .91)  ( .59)  ( .90)  ( .91)  
OPD→COR 0.00  0.03  0.00  0.06  0.02  -0.02  -0.10  
  ( .00)  ( .03)  ( .00)  ( .07)  ( .02)  (-.02)  (-.09)  
SES→AUT -0.38  0.49  -0.17  0.58  -0.36  -0.83  -0.96  
  (-.06)  ( .08)  (-.03)  ( .07)  (-.06)  (-.14)  (-.15)  
CIV→AUT -0.48 *** -0.63 *** -0.42 *** -0.42 * -0.51 ** -0.49 *** -0.41 *** 
  (-.56)  (-.77)  (-.59)  (-.31)  (-.61)  (-.58)  (-.62)  
OPD→AUT -0.15 * -0.09  -0.19 ** -0.48  -0.04  -0.08  -0.04  
  (-.14)  (-.09)  (-.20)  (-.36)  (-.03)  (-.06)  (-.04)  
SES→CIV 4.21 *** 4.82 *** 3.35 *** 2.80 *** 5.09 *** 4.28 *** 4.84 *** 
  ( .57)  ( .66)  ( .48)  ( .48)  ( .65)  ( .62)  ( .48)  
OPD→CIV 0.40 *** 0.36 ** 0.36 ** 0.28 * 0.32 ** 0.52 *** 0.47 ** 
  ( .30)  ( .30)  ( .28)  ( .29)  ( .24)  ( .36)  ( .29)  
SES→OPD 1.88 *** 1.72 ** 2.37 *** 2.00 * 2.64 *** 0.40  3.57 *** 















SES → AUT → COR  -0.27  0.37  -0.12  0.36  -0.18  -0.61  -0.88  
 (-.05)  ( .07)  (-.03)  ( .06)  (-.03)  (-.13)  (-.13)  
SES → CIV → COR  -0.57 *** -0.78 * -0.45 * -0.27  -1.51 *** -0.34  0.18  
 (-.11)  (-.15)  (-.11)  (-.05)  (-.27)  (-.07)  ( .03)  
SES → OPD → COR  0.00  0.05  -0.01  0.12  0.05  -0.01  -0.34  
 ( .00)  ( .01)  ( .00)  ( .02)  ( .01)  ( .00)  (-.05)  
SES → CIV → AUT → COR   -1.41 *** -2.29 *** -1.05 *** -0.72  -1.32 ** -1.55 *** -1.79 *** 
 (-.26)  (-.44)  (-.25)  (-.13)  (-.23)  (-.32)  (-.27)  
SES → OPD → AUT → COR  -0.20 * -0.11  -0.33 * -0.59 ** -0.05  -0.02  -0.13  
 (-.04)  (-.02)  (-.08)  (-.11)  (-.01)  ( .00)  (-.02)  
SES → OPD → CIV → COR -0.10 *** -0.10  -0.11 * -0.05  -0.25 * -0.02  0.06  
 (-.02)  (-.02)  (-.03)  (-.01)  (-.04)  ( .00)  ( .01)  
SES → OPD → CIV → AUT → COR  -0.25 *** -0.29 ** -0.26 ** -0.15  -0.22  -0.08  -0.62 ** 
  (-.05)  (-.06)  (-.06)  (-.03)  (-.04)  (-.02)  (-.10)  
OPD → AUT → COR -0.11 * -0.07  -0.14 ** -0.30 * -0.02  -0.06  -0.04  
  (-.11)  (-.08)  (-.18)  (-.33)  (-.02)  (-.06)  (-.04)  
OPD → CIV → COR -0.05 *** -0.06  -0.05 * -0.03  -0.10 ** -0.04  0.02  
  (-.06)  (-.07)  (-.06)  (-.03)  (-.10)  (-.04)  ( .02)  
OPD → CIV → AUT → COR -0.13 *** -0.17 ** -0.11 ** -0.07  -0.08 * -0.19 ** -0.17 ** 
  (-.14)  (-.20)  (-.14)  (-.08)  (-.09)  (-.19)  (-.16)  
CIV → AUT → COR -0.34 *** -0.48 *** -0.31 *** -0.26  -0.26 ** -0.36 *** -0.37 *** 
  (-.47)  (-.66)  (-.52)  (-.28)  (-.36)  (-.52)  (-.56)  
 
Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Unstandardized estimates (Standardized estimates). SES = socioeconomic status of students, CIV = civic 
knowledge, AUT = authoritarianism, OPD = classroom discussion, COR = tolerance of corruption.
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Socio economic status and tolerance of corruption 
We next evaluated a model where we constrained all parameters to zero from the 
saturated model, with the exception of the direct effects of SES on tolerance of corruption, thus 
estimating only parameters 𝛽𝑏1 and 𝛽𝑤1 from Figure 2. With this model, we retrieve the total 
effect of SES on tolerance of corruption. At the student level, this standardized coefficient is 
negative and small for the constrained model (𝛽 = -.03, SE = .01, CI95% [-.05; -.02], p<.001). 
All country specific results overlap with this estimate confidence interval, and are non-
significant for all countries, with the exception of Chile (𝛽 = -.07, SE = .02, CI95% [-.11; -.02], 
p<.01) and Paraguay (𝛽 = -.05, SE = .02, CI95% [-.09; -.00], p<.05), where both countries 
present small correlations. 
At the school level, the picture is different. We found a large negative relation between 
school SES and tolerance of corruption in the constrained model (𝛽 = -.61, SE = .04, CI95% [-
.68; -.53], p<.001). All countries present similar results, with the exception of Guatemala, where 
we found a larger gap between schools in comparison to the rest of the countries (𝛽 = -.81, SE = 
.05, CI95% [-.91; -.70], p<.001). 
Considering the results from this latter model, in comparison to the saturated model, we 
can suspect that school-level SES has indirect effects on tolerance of corruption. This is because 
the direct effects of SES are very small or null in the saturated model, whereas in the total effect 
model, we found a positive correlation between school SES and tolerance of corruption levels 
between schools. To assess how SES is related to tolerance of corruption indirectly, we inspect 
three different results: a) the fit of a full mediation model, b) the role played by the learning 
opportunity gap in terms of open classroom discussion, and c) the indirect effects of SES via the 
other variables from the saturated model. 
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We refit the saturated model constraining the direct effect of SES on tolerance of 
corruption to zero, and we constrained in a similar way the direct effect of SES on 
authoritarianism (parameters 𝛽𝑏1, 𝛽𝑤1, 𝛼𝑏1, 𝛼𝑤1 from Figure 2, all set to zero). With this model, 
we are assessing if the full mediation model hypothesis is tenable. That is, can the total relations 
of SES and tolerance of corruption can be fully explained by the mediators we proposed? This 
model expresses the intergenerational-sophistication hypothesis, where the socio-economic 
status of the parents and its relations to tolerance of corruption and to authoritarianism, are 
explained by students’ levels of civic knowledge. This model specification fits the data well in 
all the included countries, with a nonsignificant chi square (χ2(4) [min =1.28, max =8.15], p 
>=.09). However, the constrained model, reaches acceptable relative fit indexes (CFI >= .95, 
RMSEA <=.05, SRMR <= .08) (Hancock & Mueller, 2010) only when variance terms are free 
between countries (CFI = .98, RMSEA =.02, SRMR within = .02, SRMR between = .06). These 
indexes are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Model fit of the fully mediated models 
 
Multigroup Chile Colombia 
Dominican 
Republic 
Guatemala Mexico Paraguay 
χ2 270.41 3.83 8.15 1.28 4.25 3.23 6.38 
Df 104 4 4 4 4 4 4 
χ2 p value .00 .43 .09 .86 .37 .52 .17 
Parameters 106 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Deviance 819588.47 147265.92 168815.69 119091.59 108810.18 183962.94 91047.34 
AIC 819800.47 147327.92 168877.69 119153.59 108872.18 184024.94 91109.34 
BIC 820680.66 147531 169086.38 119352.69 109067.21 184235.4 91299.18 
CFI .98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
RMSEA .02 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 
SRMR within .02 .00 .01 .01 .01 .00 .01 
SRMR 
between 
.06 .02 .02 .01 .01 .02 .03 
Note. Mean point estimates of fit indexes over five multiple imputations are reported. 
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We inspect the opportunity learning gap, using the saturated model, represented by 
parameter 𝛿𝑏1 in Figure 2. This parameter estimates the relationship of schools’ SES and open 
classroom discussion levels between schools. We found a positive correlation in the constrained 
model (𝛽 = .33, SE = .06, CI95% [.22; .44], p<.001). All countries’ results on this parameter 
overlap with the confidence interval of this estimate from the constrained model. We found one 
exception, Paraguay, where a larger opportunity gap was found (𝛽 = .57, SE = .06, CI95% [.46; 
.69], p<.001). 
SES indirect effects at school level. In the constrained model (see Table 3B), we found 
that the largest standardized indirect effect of SES occurs sequentially, via the school’s civic 
knowledge and via school’s authoritarianism, to school’s tolerance of corruption (𝛽 = -.26, SE = 
.03, CI95% [-.32; -.21], p<.001). The second largest indirect effects were observed via school’s 
civic knowledge levels alone (𝛽 = -.11, SE = .02, CI95% [-0.15; -0.06], p<.001). The country 
specific results for these two indirect effects overlaps with the estimated confidence interval of 
the constrained model. 
Using the standardized indirect estimates of SES presented in Table 3B, we compute the 
absolute overall effect (Fairchild & McQuillin, 2010). Using this overall effect as a denominator, 
we calculate the proportion of the absolute overall effect involving open classroom discussion, 
between SES and tolerance of corruption at the school level. This method is recommended when 
there are different signs between the predictor and all the included mediators (Fairchild & 
McQuillin, 2010). As we have described earlier, authoritarianism is a positive predictor of 
tolerance of corruption, whereas the rest of the predictors present negative relations to tolerance 
of corruption. With the constrained model, we found an R2 mediated effect of 44% with a 
proportion of 19% of the absolute effect accounted by indirect effects involving open classroom 
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discussion. These indexes between countries are presented in Table 5. With these results, we 
show that a non-ignorable portion of the indirect effects between SES of the schools onto 
tolerance of corruption is related to the learning opportunity gap. 
Table 5 
R2 mediated effect and proportion of the absolute effects attributable to the indirect effects at the 
school level 

















Multigroup .44 .55 .96 .19 .77 
Chile .47 .87 .88 .12 .75 
Colombia .23 .72 .77 .24 .53 
Dominican Republic .29 .43 .97 .39 .58 
Guatemala .72 .72 .89 .14 .75 
Mexico .43 .56 .99 .05 .94 
Paraguay .57 .69 .88 .25 .63 
Note. ‘Abs. overall effect’ is the sum of all standardized coefficients, regardless of sign of effect. 
 
Open classroom discussion and its indirect effects at the school level 
Open classroom discussion at the school levels had significant indirect effects on 
tolerance of corruption in the constrained model (see Table 3B), via schools’ civic knowledge (𝛽 
= -.06, SE = .01, CI95% [-.08; -.03], p<.001) and via authoritarianism (𝛽 = -.11, SE = .04, 
CI95% [-.20; -.02], p<.05), and additionally via the sequential indirect effect from civic 
knowledge via authoritarianism to tolerance of corruption (𝛽 = -.14, SE = .02, CI95% [-.18; -
.10], p<.001). These estimates are of small size. All country specific-results overlap with the 
confidence interval of the estimates of the constrained model, for these three indirect effects. 
Thus, is expected that open classroom discussion contributes to lower tolerance of corruption 
among students in schools, in an indirect way, given its positive relations with civic knowledge, 
and negative relations with authoritarianism. 
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Civic knowledge and its indirect effects 
Civic knowledge of the students presents direct and indirect effects to tolerance of 
corruption. At the student level, a portion of the total effect of civic knowledge occurs via its 
negative relation with authoritarianism. In the constrained model (see Table 3A) the standardized 
estimate of this indirect effect is of -.26 (SE = .01, CI95% [-0.27; -0.24], p<.001), and accounts 
for 58% of the total effect. All country specific results overlap with this confidence interval, with 
the exception of Guatemala, where this indirect effect is smaller (𝛽 = -.21, SE = .01, CI95% [-
0.24; -0.18], p<.001). At the school level, we observe a similar result (see Table 3B); there is a 
negative indirect effect from schools’ level of civic knowledge to tolerance of corruption via 
schools’ authoritarianism (𝛽 = -.47, SE = .04, CI95% [-.55; -.38], p<.001), accounting for 70% 
of the total effect. Specific estimates from each country for this indirect effect overlap with this 
later confidence interval. Thus, in general, the effect of civic knowledge on tolerance of 
corruption is partially mediated by authoritarianism levels, between students and between 
schools. 
Discussion 
Our analysis helps us to understand and predict 8th grade students’ tolerance of corruption 
across and within six Latin-American countries. Students with high endorsement of 
authoritarianism are more prone to tolerance of corruption, in comparison to their peers. It may 
be assumed that this occurs because authoritarians submit to authority, and struggle to view 
legitimate authorities under a critical light, complying with their unethical behaviour when this 
occurs (Son Hing et al., 2007; Wang & Bernardo, 2017). The present study provides support for 
this relation, using representative samples of secondary students. In addition, corroborating the 
intergenerational-sophistication hypothesis, we show that civic knowledge is a negative predictor 
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of tolerance of corruption, over and above the socioeconomic status of the students’ families. 
Civic knowledge is a direct measure of political sophistication (Schulz et al., 2013), which 
covers the comprehension of political institutions and the code of law (Lavena, 2013), while it 
differentiates students regarding their capacity for political reflection (Schulz et al., 2013). 
Understanding the consequences of corrupt acts is a negative predictor of corruption acceptance 
(Wang & Bernardo, 2017), hence it seems that students with higher civic knowledge are more 
equipped to engage in such reflection and express less tolerance of corruption.  
Additionally, students with more political proficiency tend to be less authoritarian. 
Opposition to totalitarian rule requires students to acknowledge the duties and limits of 
authorities within the boundaries of democracy. Because more politically sophisticated students 
can critically evaluate institutions and government officials’ functioning, they are less tolerant of 
corruption. Successful civic and citizenship educational efforts should not only teach students 
content, but also critical thinking; indeed, civic competence includes questioning authorities 
when it is needed (Marquette, 2007). Specifically, these results suggest that civic knowledge, 
understood here as a measure of students’ political sophistication, is relevant both to lower 
authoritarianism and to lower tolerance of corruption. Thus, schools promoting higher civic 
knowledge have higher chances to develop a student population that condemns and denounces 
acts of corruption. 
Crucially, our results show that open classroom discussion contributes to explaining 
tolerance of corruption and authoritarianism in Latin America, in an indirect way. School 
practices that promote political sophistication and the understanding of opposing views may 
serve to protect students from endorsing authoritarian beliefs, and as a consequence, from 
condoning corruption. Conversely, in school environments where classroom discussion of 
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political and social issues is lacking, students are at higher risk of authoritarianism, and of 
becoming citizens who respond leniently to the corruption of public officials. This occurs in an 
indirect way, via its positive association with civic knowledge and its negative association with 
authoritarianism. 
The socioeconomic gap of tolerance of corruption was found in our study to be larger 
between schools than between students (within schools). There was a large correlation between 
school’s socioeconomic status and tolerance of corruption, and this indicates a double jeopardy 
(Caro & Lenkeit, 2012): students from low SES families appear to attend schools that promote 
higher rather than lower chances of tolerance of corruption. This is a worrisome result from an 
equity point of view. A non-ignorable portion of this effect is related to the learning opportunity 
gap, in that students from low SES backgrounds attend schools which are less likely to exhibit 
open classroom discussion, and thereby yield lower levels of civic knowledge, higher levels of 
authoritarianism, and higher tolerance of corruption. 
These results suggest the need to have a more complete picture of how schools can build 
citizenship attributes among students to condemn corruption, a situation that can be addressed 
along different SES strata, where students vary systematically in their levels of civic knowledge. 
Ensuring students have access to open classroom discussion of social and political issues could 
be regarded as a key learning opportunity for civic education that potentially brings returns in 
many citizenship outcomes (Knowles & McCafferty-Wright, 2015). 
Limitations. Given the cross-sectional nature of the presented data, results cannot 
guarantee causal claims (Hancock & Mueller, 2010). However, the presented results follow a 
theory driven specification of how different factors explain tolerance of corruption. We used the 
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term “effect” often, to refer to structurally defined parameters in a statistical model (Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012) that expresses our theoretical expectations.  
Also, open classroom discussion is not perceived in a homogenous way between students 
(Claes et al., 2017). The model specification we chose produces estimates which are separate 
from students’ classroom perception deviations. Specifically, we separated the deviation 
component of students within schools from the school level classroom discussion. This enabled 
us to generate school level inferences for open classroom discussion, while accounting for 
heterogeneity in students’ perceptions within school (Lüdtke, Robitzsch, Trautwein, & Kunter, 
2009). 
Finally, we used a constrained multigroup multilevel model to produce synthetic results 
that modelled the pattern of relations across countries. As such, we judged if the specific country 
results showed major departures from this general model. For this, we rely on a strict criterion: 
results were deemed different enough from the model when their confidence intervals did not 
overlap. Using this criterion, we did not find many departures of the country specific results from 
the multigroup estimate. Guatemala presented larger effects of civic knowledge on tolerance of 
corruption, and a larger socioeconomic gap for tolerance of corruption at the school level. 
Among the included countries, Guatemala possess a national curriculum that lacks coverage on 
civic values and principles, and content on institutions in comparison to the rest of the countries 
(Bascopé et al., 2015). This scenario may help to interpret these observed effects in line with the 
sophistication hypothesis. Additionally, Paraguay displayed a larger opportunity gap, where 
access to open classroom discussion was more strongly related to the school socioeconomic 
composition than the rest of the countries. These specific differences require further research. 
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Concluding remarks. From an educational perspective, these findings suggest that 
student characteristics and school processes together predict students’ tolerance of corruption. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the research discussed above, we believe that enhancing 
students’ civic knowledge to understand the rules of Latin American democracies should ideally 
be coupled with efforts to improve teachers’ abilities to promote open classroom discussions of 
political and social issues. From a conceptual perspective, the evidence presented suggests 
focusing on civic knowledge alone may not be enough to reduce the tolerance of corruption. 
Instead, having the possibility of engaging in open discussions within the classroom may be key 
to fostering the understanding of complex political matters and critical thinking to question 
authorities when needed. This school practice offers positive returns by potentially lowering 
authoritarianism, and as a consequence, lowering the tolerance of corruption. 
From the sophistication hypothesis (Houtman, 2003; Lipset, 1959), it is expected that 
participating in education promotes less authoritarianism. However, not all school environments 
have these effects on students: there is a substantial gap between vocational and mainstream 
schools, where only mainstream schools diminish authoritarianism in time (Vollebergh, 1996). A 
challenge for schools and teachers is to promote classroom discussion of controversial issues, but 
this is difficult to implement within authoritarian schools, and tends to be avoided (Quaynor, 
2012). 
Successful implementation of anticorruption efforts, such as the three-pronged model 
(Gong & Wang, 2013), require purposeful alignment from authorities and schools, so that 
teachers can promote critical thinking and guided discussions of controversial issues involving 
corruption. If democratic systems expect their citizens to participate in accountability efforts to 
prevent corruption, it is necessary that the system also provides students with the adequate 
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learning opportunities for such a task. Not all students have access to the same learning 
opportunities, such as classroom discussion (Hoskins et al., 2017). Tilting the learning 
opportunity gap in the opposite direction is a democratic necessity. 
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